Memo: Middle East Agreement
The following memo to President Carter describes the relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and advises Carter in his negotiations with Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin and President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt. In 1978, Carter invited the two leaders to Camp David, the American president's retreat. The talks there led to a 1979 treaty between the former enemies.
The White House
Washington, DC
September 19, 1978
Memorandum for the President
From: Stu Eizenstat
Subject: Middle East Agreement
Please permit me to make the following suggestions regarding the solidification of your Middle East triumph:
1. Talk with both Sadat and Begin — particularly Begin — as soon as possible while they are in this country and urge them to recognize the political sensitivity of the other party's position and to give as flexible an interpretation to the agreement as possible. At the Vice President's reception last night for Jewish leaders, a number conveyed to me their concerns that Begin will both "crow" about what he has obtained and give the strictest interpretation possible, as evidenced by his interview with Barbara Walters. They urge that you tell Begin that he must be sensitive to Sadat's problems and attempt to help, not hinder, Sadat's selling of this accord.
2. To reinforce this statement to Begin, I think that a number of Jewish Congressmen and Senators would be willing to convey the same message. Frank and/or the Vice President might help accomplish this.
3. Perhaps most important, since the success of these accords will depend heavily on the Saudi reaction, I suggest that the Vice President and/or Frank very quietly get a group of moderate senators who supported the Saudi arms sale to visit the Saudi Ambassador. They might state that they had supported the arms sale despite the political objections here because they knew Saudi Arabia would be a strong friend of the United States and peace in the Middle East. They might also say that now is a critical time for Saudi Arabia to show moderation and support for Sadat. They might leave the clear message that Saudi Arabia cannot expect future support in the United States Senate if it "blows" the Sadat/Begin agreement. I think this is of critical importance.
cc: The Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Hamilton Jordan, Frank Moore

